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Abstract 
Objective: This study sought to understand how emergency physicians decide to utilize 
observation services, DQGKRZSODFLQJDSDWLHQWXQGHUREVHUYDWLRQLQIOXHQFHVSK\VLFLDQV¶
subsequent decision-making. 
Methods: We conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with 24 emergency physicians, 
including 10 from a hospital in the American Midwest, and 14 from two hospitals in central and 
northern England. Data were extracted from the interview transcripts using open coding and 
analyzed using axial coding. 
Results: We found that physicians used a mix of intuitive and analytic thinking in initial 
decisions to admit, observe, or discharge patients depending on tKHSK\VLFLDQ¶VLQGLYLGXDOOHYHO
of risk aversion. Placing patients under observation made some physicians more systematic, 
while others cautioned against overreliance on observation services in the face of uncertainty. 
Conclusions: Emergency physicians routinely make decisions in a highly resource-constrained 
environment. Observation services can relax these constraints by providing physicians with 
additional time, but absent clear protocols and metacognitive reflection on physician practice 
patterns, this may hinder²rather than facilitate²decision-making. 
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Introduction 
Background 
The last decade has seen a substantial increase in observation services²hospital-based 
ambulatory care used to evaluate and treat patients presenting at the ED, while a decision is 
made regarding admission or discharge.1 While evidence from both England and the U.S. 
demonstrates that observation services can reduce unnecessary inpatient admissions, reduce 
inappropriate ED discharges, and improve diagnosis and treatment,2,3 analyses of claims or 
medical records contribute little to our understanding of how emergency physicians think. 
Consequently, little is known about how physicians decide to place patients under observation, 
or how this LQIOXHQFHVSK\VLFLDQV¶VXEVHTXHQWGHFLVLRQ-making. As the use of observation 
services continues to rise, answering these questions is important.1,4  
Emergency physicians now have more information and options to consider in their 
decision-making. Crudely, the process has moved from binary (admit/discharge) to ternary 
(admit/observe/discharge), with observation affording the opportunity to gather additional 
information. ,ISK\VLFLDQV¶LQLWLDOGHFLVLRQ-making processes lead them to incorrect decisions, 
they risk discharging patients prematurely²with obvious deleterious implications for patient 
safety²or observing or admitting patients unnecessarily²with implications for efficient 
resource use, patient experience, and potential iatrogenic harm. SimilaUO\REVHUYDWLRQ¶V 
usefulness largely depends on the degree to which it facilitates better decision-making²whether 
the extra time and opportunities for diagnostic testing it affords are used effectively for the 
patients who stand to benefit most.5 While a few studies have examined emergency physician 
decision-making, we know of none examining decision-making in the context of observation 
services.6-11 
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Goals of This Investigation 
This study sought to understand how emergency physicians make decisions about 
observation services use. Because this decision may be influenced by health policies 
governing payment and care delivery²for example, the four-hour maximum wait in the 
ED in England,12 and pressures to maximize hospital reimbursement peculiar to the 
U.S.13²we examine HPHUJHQF\SK\VLFLDQV¶GHFLVLRQ-making in two differently 
structured national health care systems (England and the U.S.). We have previously 
described why we selected these two countries and the general role observation services 
plays in both.14 We hypothesize that emergency physicians rely more heavily on intuitive 
thinking when deciding to place patients under observation. Conversely, we hypothesize 
that the extra time afforded by placing patients under observation may permit physicians 
to increase reliance on analytic thinking. 
Methods 
Study Design and Setting 
We conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with a convenience sample of 24 
emergency physicians, including 10 from a large academic medical center in the American 
Midwest, and 14 from two large academic medical centers in central and northern England. We 
initially planned to sample 10 physicians at each site, but achieved thematic saturation earlier 
than expected, as the interviewers jointly determined that no new themes had emerged during 
several subsequent interviews. We contacted physicians by email and/or telephone, informed 
them about the study, and invited their participation. To ensure representation of various 
perspectives, we sought a mix of physicians by gender and practice experience. To encourage 
participation, interviewees received a $50 Amazon.com gift card. 
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Data Collection 
Physicians agreeing to participate received a follow-up email and/or telephone call to 
schedule an interview time. We conducted and digitally recorded all interviews in person. One 
interviewer was American and the other was English, and both conducted approximately half of 
the interviews in each country, to balance any cultural biases that might otherwise occur in a 
cross-national study. Interviewers used a guide containing fixed-response and open-ended 
questions developed from the observation literature in consultation with our emergency 
physician co-investigators (see Appendix). Questions specific to the decision-making process 
were guided conceptually by dual process theory. We allowed discussions to evolve naturally, 
not asking all questions in every instance, altering question order, and asking unscripted 
questions as appropriate to probe emerging topics of interest. Then, we had the audio files 
professionally transcribed. 
Analysis 
Initially, a trained research assistant read all transcripts to gain familiarity with the data, 
note any emerging themes, and enVXUHWKDWUHVSRQGHQWV¶UHPDrks were accurately captured. Then, 
she manually coded the interviews in Microsoft Word, beginning with codes derived from the 
interview guide, and creating additional codes as suggested by the data, ensuring that 
unanticipated themes were incorporated into the analysis. Two co-authors from different 
disciplinary backgrounds conducted a non-blinded review of the coded transcripts to verify their 
accuracy, and discussed coding discrepancies (which were minimal) until they reached 
consensus. Finally, we used axial coding to develop an integrative understanding of the 
connections between codes that explained our data and provided a conceptual framework for 
presenting our results.15 We also shared results with clinical members of the research team and 
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sought their feedback to ensure face validity. The study was approved by the [blinded] IRB 
(Approval #201502838). The funding sources had no role in this study. 
Results  
Characteristics of Study Subjects 
Our sample of 24 emergency physicians consisted of 5 women and 19 men in full-time 
practice and covered a wide range of experience levels in both countries. The American 
physicians averaged 7.8 years¶ post-residency practice experience in emergency medicine 
(range: 2 ± 17 years). The English physicians averaged 6.9 years of practice experience in 
emergency medicine at consultant grade (rough equivalent of post-residency practice in the UK) 
(range: 1 ± 15 years). While the use of care pathways was described in the English medical 
centers, neither the English nor American study sites had explicit inclusion/exclusion criteria for 
observation services use. In the American study site, the care of observation patients was 
assumed by hospitalists, while in the English study sites, this care continued to be provided by 
the emergency physician. 
Main Results 
Based on the interview data, we present three overarching themes derived from axial 
coding as summarized in Figure 1)LUVWZHH[SORUHWKHSK\VLFLDQ¶VLQLWLDOGHFLVLRQWRDGPLW
observe, or discharge. In particular, we examine the tradeoffs between the benefits of heuristics 
in resource-constrained environments and the potential for cognitive biases. Next, we shift 
specifically to the rationales physicians invoked for observation services use. Participants 
described a mix of benefits²e.g., additional time to gather clinical data and deliver protocol-
driven care²and drawbacks²e.g., use of observation to avoid admission and discharge 
decisions. )LQDOO\ZHH[SORUHKRZDSK\VLFLDQ¶Vdecision-making may change once a patient is 
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placed in observation. While all respondents agreed participants that observation services 
permitted more time for decision-making, some saw that as an opportunity to think more 
systematically, while others warned that it could foster cognitive biases.  
The initial decision to admit, observe, or discharge patients 
When a patient presents at the ED, the SK\VLFLDQ¶Vprimary task is risk stratification, 
which, according to respondents in both countries, begins with rapidly ruling out life-threatening 
conditions: 
The first thing that we are always thinking is: Do they have one of 10 or 15 
diagnoses that is going to kill them right now? (US #1) 
 
,QWKH('ZH¶UHPRUHIRFXVHGRQZKDW¶VWKHZRUVWWKLQJLWFDQEHDQGFDQ,VD\
LW¶V QRW WKH ZRUVW WKLQJ" 2U DP , VWLOO ZRUULHd about the worst thing? And you 
PLJKWGRWHVWLQJWRSURYHLW¶VQRWWKHZRUVWWKLQJ (US #8) 
 
In the emergency room \RX¶UH WU\LQJ WR UXOH RXW WKLQJV WKDW DUH JRLQJ WR NLOO
people really.«,¶GZRUNRXWZKDW, think is the serious diagnosis ,GHILQLWHO\GRQ¶W 
want to miss and then work ouWZD\VRIUXOLQJWKHPRXW«and then do those tests. 
(England #1) 
To get a more concrete sense of this initial decision-making process, we asked 
interviewees to walk us through their approach to handling patients using two common 
presentations: chest pain and abdominal pain. In both cases, their responses underscored the use 
of risk-stratification: 
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Somebody comes in with the complaint of chest pain [my] first question is: Are 
they having an ST eleYDWLRQP\RFDUGLDOLQIDUFWLRQ«"[My second question is:]  
Are they having one of a number of other potential rapidly fatal causes of chest 
pain?....[M]y third question is, do they have an alternate diagnosis that I can 
clearly establish with evidence gathered in the emergency department such as 
pneumonia, such as spontaneous pneumothorax, such as shingles of the chest? [I]n 
those patients in whom acute coronary syndrome should be considered as even a 
potential diagnosis, then I go through one, I go through two, I go through three, 
and if the answer to questions one, two, and WKUHHDUHDOOQRWKRVH«SDWLHQWV«are 
going into the observation unit. (US #7)   
The same sort of process was observed for abdominal pain: 
2QFH\RX¶YHJRWVRUWRIWKHSDLQTXHVWLRQVRXWRIWKHZD\\RX¶GZDQWWRNQRZ
if there were any associated symptoms, diarrhea, vomiting, PR bleeding, 
KHPDWHPHVLVDQ\WKLQJOLNHWKDW,QDPDOH\RX¶GZDQWWRNQRZDERXWWHVWLFXODU
SDLQ,QDIHPDOH\RX¶GZDQWWRNQRZDERXWSUHJQDQFLHVSUHYLRXV
pregnancies, gynecological KLVWRU\«I would then tailor my further 
questioning, depending on the answers to those sort of base questions. Again, 
DOZD\VWKLQNLQJWKDWWKHUH¶VJRLQJWREHVRPHWKLQJWKDWZLOOFDWFK\RXRXW
somewhere. And patients²WKLQNLQJDERXWZKDW¶VFRPPRQLQFHUWDLQDJH
groups. Belly pain go through to your back in a 75-year-ROGWKDW¶VDUXSWXUH
triple A until proven otherwise. (England #2) 
In any event, this initial risk stratification process happens quickly, and respondents 
indicated their ability to make very rapid decisions: 
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You can probably pick up within 30 seconds, two minutes, whether you think 
someone is going to need admission. (England #2) 
 
A skilled emergency physician probably knows whether the patient is going home 
or being admitted within about two to five minutes of walking into a room, 
looking at the patient, looking at their vital signs, taking a couple focused 
questions and examining them... (US #2) 
 
[I] I \RX¶YH EHHQ GRLQJ LW IRU D ZKLOH \RX FDQ QLQH WLPHV RXW RI WHQ ORRN DW D
patient and the first 15 seconds knRZZKDW WKDWSDWLHQW¶VXOWLPDWHGLVSRVLWLRQ LV
going to be. (US #3) 
While some referred to these rapid and seemingly intuitive decisions as ³gut instinct,´ 
others described patterns arising from learned experience²in accordance with Klein¶V
recognition-primed decision model.16 As two respondents put it:  
[O]ver time you start to reFRJQL]H D SDWWHUQ«patients fit into a certain group 
based on age, medical problePV FKLHI FRPSODLQWV WKH\ KDYH«>2@nce you 
determine what yoX¶UH JRLQJ WR GR ZLWK WKDW«group then decision-making 
becomes a little bit easier. (US #2) 
 
$V \RX«progress in your career, the gut instinct starts coming in a lot 
PRUH«>7@his is what experience is all about that you see a lot more patients and 
you start developing patterns in your brain DQG«UHFRJQL]LQJ WKHP«earlier. 
(England #9) 
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While pattern recognition DQG³JXWLQVWLQFW´DUHWZRZD\VRIGHVFULELQJWKHVDPH
phenomenon, respondents also stressed the importance of the replicability of analytic thinking: 
Being [an emergency]  SHGLDWULFLDQ IRU  \HDUV ,¶G EH IRROLVK WR VD\ WKDW JXW
instinct doHVQ¶WFRPHLQWRLW«bXW«,FDQ¶WEHXVLQJWKHSURFHVVSXUHO\RQLQVWLQFW
EHFDXVH,FDQ¶WWUDLQ WKDWLQVRPHERG\ZKR¶VRQO\JRWVL[PRQWKV¶ experience. It 
VWLOOKDVWREHUHODWLYHO\JXLGHOLQHGULYHQLQWHUPVRILWGRHVQ¶WPDWWHUZKR\RXVHH
WKDWWKH\¶UHJRLQJWRPDNH DVDIHGHFLVLRQ«(England #3) 
Similarly, most participants noted the utility of evidence-based protocols in guiding them 
to an initial diagnosis, while acknowledging the role of clinical judgment. As one participant put 
it, ³SDWLHQWVDUHQRWJRLQJWRFRPHZLWKJXLGHOLQHVLQWKHLUSUHVHQWDWLRQ´so ³WKHUHLVDOZD\V
space for using common VHQVHLQEHWZHHQ´(England #4). Often, these decisions to ignore 
evidence-based guidelines seemed designed to err on the side of caution, and were usually driven 
by UHVSRQGHQWV¶ own risk aversion DQGWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKHµKRUURUVWRU\¶: 
You always have thaWVRUWRIJXWLQVWLQFW«ZKHUH\RXMXVWIHHOVRPHWKLQJGRHVQ¶W
VRXQG ULJKW RU WKLV GRHVQ¶W ORRN ULJKW WR PH DQG ,¶P JRLQJ WR RYer-investigate 
\RX«EHFDXVH«VRPHWKLQJMXVWVD\VWRPHGRQ¶WVHQGWKLVSHUVRQKRPH(QJODQG
#5) 
 
[I] t just sort of gives you a sensHLQWKHSLWRI\RXUVWRPDFKWKDWWKLVLVQ¶t one to 
WDNHD ULVNRQ«We always hear about the patients that you sent home that you 
VKRXOGQ¶WKDYH86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[Y]ou might think, oh gosh, one of my mates once told me about a 30-year-old with no 
risk factors who had chest pain reproducible by palpation who died of an MI two weeks 
later. If you allow that sort of bias to creep in, then you start making daft decisions like 
ordering troponin tests on 30-year-olds with reproducible chest wall pain who have no 
risk factors for coronary heart disease. (England #6) 
Upon conscious reflection, several participants indicated that a 5±10% risk of an adverse 
outcome would keep them from discharging a patient, although one respondent admitted that the 
true threshold is even lower: 
You know, LIZHDUHUHDOO\EHLQJKRQHVWLW¶VSUobably close to two or one [percent] . We 
all say five so we sound good. (US #1) 
Facilitating or postponing decision-making? The rationale for using observation 
Setting aside patients obviously warranting admission or discharge, both English and 
American physicians reported that observation services are indicated when there is a clear need 
to gather additional information or when the diagnosis and treatment plan are well-established 
and time-limited: 
[P]utting them in the observation unit would give us time for the disease to 
present iWVHOI HVVHQWLDOO\«>)RU H[DPSOH@«ZH NQRZ«DSSHQGLFLWLV«ZLOO JHW
worse over the next 24 hours so in that type of situation, observation is really 
quite good. (US #3) 
 
Observation XQLWV IRU PH DUH DERXW WLPH DV D WRRO«:H MXVW VRPHWLPHV QHHG
longer with these patients to see which way their disease is progressing and 
WKHUHIRUHZH¶UHVWUDWLI\LQJWKHPUDWKHUWKDQMXVWDYHU\GHILQLWLYHYHU\EODFNDQG
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white decision of admission or home. It gives us a third way and it keeps patients 
safe. (England #3) 
 
, WKLQN LI \RX FDQ¶W FUHDWH D SURWRFRO IRU WKHP«that means there is enough 
ambiguity and diagnosis questioning that they may not be ideal for obs. (US #5)  
 
Those patients that need obseUYDWLRQQRUPDOO\«LW¶VWKHVRUWRISDWLHQWZKHUH\RX
need to do an intervention of some GHVFULSWLRQ«2QFH \RX¶YH GRQH WKDW
LQWHUYHQWLRQRUWZRWKH\¶UHJRRGWRJRKRPH(QJODQG 
 
,¶PREVHUYLQJWKLVSDWLHQWVSHFLILFDOO\WRORRNIRUWKLVWKLQJDQGLI,ILQGLW,¶OO
DGPLWWKHP,I,GRQ¶W,¶OOGLVFKDUJHWKHP(England #6) 
 
However, many physicians in both England and the U.S. mentioned that observation 
services were sometimes used to postpone decision-making. If the physician is uncomfortable 
deciding to admit or discharge, he or she may place patients in observation by default: 
 
 >,W¶V@ sometimes cynically called WKH FOLQLFDO LQGHFLVLRQ XQLW«EHFDXVH LW¶V DQ
HDV\RSWLRQIRUMXQLRUGRFWRU<RX¶GVHHDWULFN\SDWLHQW\RX¶UHZRQGHULQJWKH\
look okay. I thinN,FDQVHQGWKHPKRPHEXW,¶YHKHDUGWKHVHKRUURUVWRULHVDERXW
SHRSOHGURSSLQJGHDGWZRGD\VDIWHUWKH\¶UHVHQWKRPH,¶OOGRVRPHEORRGWHVWV
,¶OOSXWWKHPRQWKHGHFLVLRQXQLW%\WKHWLPHWKHEORRGWHVWVFRPHEDFN,¶OOKDYH
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finished my shift, or ma\EH,¶OOEHIHHOLQJPRUHGHFLVLYH6RPHWKLQJZLOOKDSSHQ. 
(England #6) 
 
3HRSOHZKRGRQ¶WZDQWWRGHFLGHZKDWWRGRZLWKWKHLUSDWLHQWMXVWZDQWWRKDQG
WKHP RQ WR WKH QH[W GRFWRU ZLOO SXW WKHP GRZQ WKHUH $QG VRPHWLPHV WKDW¶V D
conscious thing, and more RIWHQ LW¶V SUREDEO\ QRW D FRQVFLRXV WKLQJ«I would 
DVVXPHWKH\¶UH WKLQNLQJ«>W@ime and some investigations may help this. (England 
#7) 
Thus, observation not only offers an opportunity to gather additional information and 
improve decision quality, but also represents a means of postponing decision-making, without a 
clear idea of how observation might improve decisions. Of course, postponing the ultimate 
GHFLVLRQDERXWWKHSDWLHQW¶VGLVSRVLWLRQLVLWVHOIDGHFLVLRQ. Thus, the availability of observation 
services does not necessarily result in further data collection to make decisions. 
Decision-making in the context of observation 
Beyond the decision to observe, it is equally important to understand whether and how 
SK\VLFLDQV¶decision-making changes once the contextual environment has been altered by 
placing the patient in observation. We expected that this would afford physicians additional time, 
enabling them to shift from intuitive to analytic thinking, but that was not always the case. 
The observation unit was clearly considered a more comfortable, less stressful 
environment compared to the ED, which many saw as an opportunity to approach patients more 
systematically: 
,¶PQRW VR WLPHSUHVVXUHG WRPDNHDGHFLVLRQRQ WKHP\HW VR \HDK LW SUREDEO\
does slow things down perhaps. (England #1) 
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There are patients where you just become a little bit more relaxed and you can 
VD\DFWXDOO\,¶YHJRWDELWPRUHWLPHQRZ,FDQKDYHDPRUHRIDWKLQNDURXQG
this, we can just seHKRZWKLQJVJR« (England #5)    
 
I usually spend a lot more time before arriving at the firm conclusion that a 
SDWLHQW FDQ JR KRPH«[M]y decision-making processes or my investigative 
processes are just as systematic if not more systematic once I am on [the 
observation unit] . (England #8) 
Alternatively, some respondents felt that the additional time afforded by placing a patient 
in observation could harm decision-making: 
Certainly giving yourself more time to think about things is a helpful part of the 
SURFHVV«[However,]  the more time you have to think about a patient, the more 
you start thinking of those horror stories and the more of these cognitive biases 
[you] pick up. (England #6) 
Limitations 
 Our study is subject to some limitations. Foremost among these is the difficulty in 
DVVHVVLQJSK\VLFLDQV¶ cognitive decision-making processes via a retrospective interview format, 
which introduces the possibility of recall bias. It is notoriously difficult to explicitly ask 
questions about an inherently subconscious process like intuitive reasoning. Related to this, 
participants often offered examples about how others practice, which may be even less accurate 
WKDQRQH¶VRZQPHWDFRJQLWLYHSURFHVVHV:KLOHGLUHFWREVHUYDWLRQRISK\VLFLDQVLQSUDFWLFHRU
interviews occurring immediately following decision-making could reduce such bias, doing so is 
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potentially resource intensive, raises issues of patient confidentiality, and is likewise subject to 
its own biases (e.g., the Hawthorne effect). Another limitation is that our reliance on physicians 
at just three hospitals may limit the transferability of our findings to the extent that there is 
homogeneity of practice within a given setting. However, recent work has documented 
significant inter-physician practice variation even within a single ED.17 Still, despite including 
physicians with a range of practice experience, our convenience sample is admittedly skewed 
towards younger physicians. To the extent that physician decision-making changes with practice 
experience, this may introduce maturation effects, and to the extent that the younger physicians 
trained in an era of clinical guidelines and protocols, whereas more seasoned physicians did not, 
this may introduce cohort effects. However, both of these biases would be a greater concern in a 
quantitative study, whereas the goal of our qualitative analysis was to identify concepts and 
uncover diverse perspectives, which our sample certainly accomplished. 
Discussion 
Emergency physician decision-making is an underrepresented area in the study of 
medical decision-making. In the emergency department (ED)SK\VLFLDQVPXVW³assess patients 
ZLWKZKRP«>WKH\DUH@«unfamiliar, within narrow time frames, anG«ZLWKOLPLWHGUHVRXUFHV´18 
Some feel this increases reliance on intuitive thinking, exacerbates errors, and adversely impacts 
patient outcomes,19-22 while others suggest that heuristics (in the form of experience-based 
pattern-PDWFKLQJPD\EHXVHGWRDUULYHTXLFNO\DWD³ZRUNDEOHFKRLFH´ZLWKPLQLPDODQDO\WLF
reasoning.16,23-26 Proponents of analytic thinking argue that physicians should minimize intuitive 
thinking in favor of protocol-driven care,27-31 while proponents of intuitive thinking argue that 
inadequate medical knowledge²not use of heuristics²causes diagnostic error32-34 and they 
encourage the development and use of ³IDVW-and-IUXJDO´GHFLVLRQWUHHV34,35 However, still others 
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have questioned the very notion of distinct intuitive and analytic thought processes, instead 
proposing a single, highly adaptive, closed-loop abductive muddling thought process of expert 
decision-making.36 
To our knowledge, no prior work has examined this decision-making in the context of 
rapidly growing observation services use. Prior to the advent of observation services, physicians 
faced a binary choice to admit or discharge patients. Now, there are three options. As we have 
previously discussed, both policy and patient socioeconomic factors can influence emergency 
SK\VLFLDQV¶GHFLVLRQVWRXVHREVHUYDWLRQVHUYLFHV14 Here, however, we focus exclusively on the 
cognitive aspects of clinical decision-making and observation services use in the ED. Our 
findings provide a better understanding of how the introduction of observation services has 
LQIOXHQFHGSK\VLFLDQV¶decision-making, KRZSK\VLFLDQV¶decision-making has influenced use of 
observation services, and how intuitive and analytic thinking influence both of these processes. 
The initial decision to admit, observe, or discharge a patient was overwhelmingly 
described as a process of risk stratifying patients. In contrast to our DQGRWKHUV¶expectations,37-39 
we did not find a linear, stepwise progression from a rapid intuitive differential diagnosis to a 
more considered analytic reappraisal, but rather a varying reliance on both modes.40 While 
emergency physicians express a preference for analytic reasoning in the abstract,41 our findings 
suggest a more pragmatic, mixed cognitive approach occurs within the resource-constrained 
environment of the ED. 
Physicians essentially described using heuristics to make safe and timely decisions. 
Foremost among these were WKH³FRPPRQWKLQJ´DQG³ZRUVWFDVH´KHXULVWLFV²the first 
representing a confirmatory search for the most likely explanation given DSDWLHQW¶V symptoms 
and the second representing a ruling out search for the least likely, but most potentially harmful, 
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explanation for those same symptoms.11 By asking tailored questions and ordering certain tests, 
the emergency physician delineates diagnostic boundaries, quickly generates differential 
diagnoses, and determines whether to admit, observe, or discharge the patient.  
Consistent with prior research, our respondents indicated that this process happens very 
quickly²often in as little as 15 seconds to 5 minutes.9,42 Such rapid, heuristic-based decisions 
suggest intuitive thinking, but experienced individuals can make rapid decisions using analytic 
thinking, by quickly working through the steps of a care protocol. Flach and colleagues argue 
that this is a single cognitive muddling process that simply feels more or less intuitive depending 
on the ease of pattern recognition.36  
In the resource-constrained environment of the ED, physicians are going to²at least 
occasionally²make mistakes. If they err on the side of caution, the result is a false alarm. If they 
err in the other direction, they risk missing a serious condition. Using heuristics is an efficient 
way for emergency physicians to make decisions, but it is not without its limits. While most 
respondents indicated that observation services exist to provide time-limited treatment prior to 
discharge, or specific further testing prior to making the admission or discharge decision, 
respondents in both countries also acknowledged the use of observation services to mitigate fears 
of missing something important²even if such an outcome is highly improbable. Similar to 
recent work on emergency physician risk estimates and admission decisions, our respondents 
indicated that a 1% risk of an adverse outcome was sufficient to prevent them from discharging a 
patient [cite Schriger et al. 2018]. While this is unlikely to result in worse clinical outcomes, it 
may lead to inefficient use of health care resources, inconvenience for patients, ED crowding, 
and lower quality of care. Fortunately, respondents suggested that this tendency towards 
overreliance on observation services as a ³VDIHW\QHW´diminishes with practice experience. 
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Presumably, this is because physician pattern recognition improves and risk tolerance increases. 
It is also important to note that emergency physicians do not make decisions in isolation. EDs 
function as a team, the checks and balances of which can combat the limitations of heuristics.36 
Thus, more senior physicians may prevent their less experienced colleagues from using 
observation services less judiciously. 
Respondents suggested that their subsequent decision-making could be differentially 
influenced by placing patients in observation. While all respondents suggested that observation 
services are delivered in a more relaxed environment versus the ED, there was disagreement 
about whether the additional time was helpful or harmful to decision-making. Some respondents 
indicated that observation provides a greater opportunity for analytic thinking. This might occur 
through an iterative process. For example, a patient is placed in observation, receives a test, the 
physician sees the test result, reevaluates the patient and proceeds to discharge, admit, or order 
further indicated testing. However, other respondents argued that having extra time could 
backfire, allowing physicians to succumb further to the very thought processes responsible for 
WKHSDWLHQW¶VLQLWLDOSODFHPHQWLQRbservation. 
Overall, our findings suggest that emergency physicians use heuristics to make safe and 
timely decisions about admitting or discharging patients. Observation services are a tool that can 
facilitate or impede that process depending on the SK\VLFLDQ¶VLQGLYLGXDOOHYHORIrisk aversion, 
and the policy incentives and clinical norms inherent to the health care system in which they 
practice. Less experienced or otherwise more risk-averse physicians may be inclined to use 
observation to postpone the ultimate decision of admission or discharge, and while the additional 
time observation affords is often beneficial to decision-making, it can also lead to unnecessary 
testing and extended stays in the hospital. 
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Accordingly, we suggest two sets of interventions that might facilitate optimal evidence-
based observation services use.2,43-48 First, it seems sensible to establish clear criteria for 
placement in observation that focus on using observation to facilitate the admission-versus-
discharge decision, rather than avoiding decisions under the guise of watchful waiting 
(recognizing that for some conditions like head injury, watchful waiting is itself an appropriate 
protocol). Simultaneously, once a patient is placed under observation, they must be approached 
with defined endpoints in mind, lest the extra time merely result in over-investigation and 
delayed admission or discharge.  
Second, we endorse the calls of others for more explicit consideration of the role of 
intuitive and analytic thinking.20,37 Physicians need to understand the strengths and weaknesses 
of both approaches, and deliberately engage in metacognitive reflection on their practice 
patterns. Croskerry (2014) suggests numerous interventions to improve the quality of intuitive 
thinking and prompt appropriate resort to analytic thinking. Given that every decision to admit, 
observe or discharge is ultimately a matter of physician judgement rather than presence or 
absence of options and protocols, such interventions would appear vital if the appropriate, 
delicate balance between patient safety, optimal outcome, and system efficiency is to be 
achieved. 
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